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Abstract
In this article, we show, in the context of partial hedging, that some important
relationships about comonotonicity and convex order cannot be translated to counter-
monotonicity in general because of the possibility of over-hedging. We propose a new
notion called proper hedge that can eectively avoid over-hedging. Dierent characteriza-
tions of a proper hedge are given, and we show that this notion is useful in translating rela-
tionship between comonotonicity and convex order to the case of counter-comonotonicity.
As an application, we apply our results to identify desirable structural properties of in-
surance indemnities that make an insurance contract appealing to both the policyholder
and the insurer.
Key words: hedging, comonotonicity, counter-monotonicity, convex order, Tail Value-
at-Risk
1 Introduction
Consider a portfolio with random value X at the end of the reference period. We dene a hedge
for this portfolio as an additional asset that can be added to the portfolio to oset the price
movements of the original portfolio. Hence, adding the hedge reduces the risk (in some sense)
associated with the portfolio value at the end of the reference period. To formalize the idea,
we introduce the following denition.
Denition 1 A random variable Z is said to be a hedge for the random variable X if
Var(X + Z)  Var(X):
Moreover, Z is said to be a convex hedge for X if
X + Z cx X + E(Z): (1)
If, in addition (X;Z) is counter-monotonic, Z is said to be a counter-monotonic convex hedge
for X.
1Obviously, a convex hedge is a hedge, but not vice versa in general.
In mathematical nance or in portfolio theory, a hedge usually refers to a self-nancing
portfolio that replicates some given nancial claim at a future time point, see, for instance,
Bj ork (2009). In this paper, the denition of a (convex, counter-monotonic convex) hedge is
less stringent. The requirement of exact replication is relaxed to reduction of risk (variability)
dened through variance order or convex order. Therefore, the (convex, counter-monotonic
convex) hedges we dene and study in this paper have to be understood as partial hedges in
the traditional sense.
Before investigating the notion of counter-monotonic convex hedges, we recall the following
well-known properties about comonotonic sums and convex order. For any integrable random
variables X;Y , and Z,
X cx Y; (Y;Z) is comonotonic =) X + E(Z) cx Y + Z (2)
and
X cx Y; (Y;Z) is comonotonic =) X + Z cx Y + Z: (3)
Both (2) and (3) are special cases of a more general result (see Lemma 4 below), which asserts
that if Xi cx Yi for i = 1;2 and if (Y1;Y2) is comonotonic, then X1 + X2 cx Y1 + Y2.
Since comonotonicity and counter-monotonicity are two opposite extremal dependence struc-
tures, it is natural to consider whether analogous results of (2) and (3) hold for counter-
monotonicity. More precisely, one conjectures that
X cx Y; (X;Z) is counter-monotonic =) X + Z cx Y + E(Z): (4)
and
X cx Y; (X;Z) is counter-monotonic =) X + Z cx Y + Z (5)
One possible interpretation of statement (4) is that if position X is less risky than position
Y (X cx Y ), and asset Z can oset price movements of X ((X;Z) is counter-monotonic), then
position X +Z is again less risky than Y (plus the constant E(Z)). In particular, according to
Denition 1, (4) would mean that any asset that is counter-monotonic with X is a convex hedge
of X. For statement (5), the interpretation would be that the order of riskiness is preserved on
the portfolio level when an asset that is counter-comonotonic to the less risky sub-portfolio is
added to both sub-portfolios.
Unfortunately, neither conjecture (4) nor (5) holds true in general, as demonstrated by the
following counter-example.
Example 1 Let W be any standard normal variable, and dene
(X;Y;Z) := ( W=2; W;2W);
2then X cx Y , and (X;Z) is counter-monotonic. But X + Z = 3W=2 cx  W = Y , which
contradicts (4). If we dene
(X;Y;Z) := ( W=2; W;W)
instead, then X + Z = W=2 cx 0 = Y + Z, which contradicts (5).
The reason why X +Z is even riskier than both Y and Y +Z in the example above is that
Z \over-hedges" X in that adding Z to X not only eliminates the original risk of X but also
introduces additional risk. Indeed, we can easily see that counter-monotonicity of (X;Z) does
not necessarily imply that Z is a hedge for X. To this end, we notice that
Var(X + Z)  Var(X) () Var(Z)   2Cov(X;Z):
The counter-monotonicity of (X;Z) only guarantees the positivity of  2Cov(X;Z), but in case
Var(Z) is suciently large when compared to  2Cov(X;Z), Z will not be a hedge, and thus
not a convex hedge for X. This simple consideration suggests the possibility of over-hedging if
Z itself is too risky.
From the above counter-example and discussion, one sees that for a given position X, not
every counter-monotonic asset Z is risk-reducing because of the possibility of over-hedging. The
objectives of this paper are twofold. First, in Section 3, we propose a new notion called proper
hedge, which requires a counter-monotonic asset to satisfy an additional condition. Natural
interpretations and dierent characterizations of the additional condition will be given. In
Section 4, we prove that a proper hedge will never over-hedge by showing that both conjectures
(4) and (5) hold true when Z is a proper hedge of X. In Section 5, we apply results obtained in
Sections 3 and 4 to the study of the marketability of insurance indemnities. We identify desirable
properties that an indemnity schedule should possess in order for the insurance contracts to
be benecial to both the policyholder and the insurer. Finally, in Section 6, we extend and
complement various existing results and results established in Sections 3 and 4 by considering
more general dependence structures such as (positive and negative) association and quadrant
dependence.
Before closing this introduction, we want to emphasize that the concepts and denitions
of hedging studied in this paper are purely based on stochastic ordering in which the level
of riskiness of positions are compared by convex order. We do not take into consideration
the preference of individual decision maker as well as the (no-arbitrage) market price of a
hedge. Indeed, while a convex hedge can reduce the risk of a given position, an expected utility
maximizer is not always better o by buying a convex hedge. To see this, assume that his
utility function is given by some increasing and concave function u. He will only purchase an
additional asset Z if the following inequality is fullled:
E([u(X + Z   (Z))]  E([u(X)]; (6)
where (Z) is the market price of Z. The fact that Z is a convex hedge for X does not necessarily
imply that (6) is fullled. Furthermore, it may happen that inequality (6) is fullled even if Z
is not a convex hedge for X. These possibilities are illustrated by the following example.
3Example 2 (i) Suppose that Z is a convex hedge for X (so that X + Z cx X + E(Z) by
denition). If (Z) > E(Z) and u(x) := x for all x, then (6) is violated.
(ii) Suppose that Z is a random variable such that Var(Z) >  2Cov(X;Z). If (Z) = E(Z)
and u(x) = x for all x, then (6) is fullled, but Z is not a convex hedge of X because (1) is
violated.
In spite of these negative results, we will show in Section 5 that the idea of convex hedges
and the results to be established in Sections 3 and 4 have an interesting application in the
context of designing insurance indemnity schedules, in which the decision maker is assumed to
be an expected utility maximizer.
2 Preliminaries
This section serves to introduce the notations used in this paper and recall the denitions
and properties of three inter-related concepts, namely, convex order, comonotonicity, and Tail
Value-at-Risk (TVaR).
All random variables discussed in this paper are dened on a common probability space
(
;F;P), and are assumed to be integrable. Given random variables X and Y , we say that
X is smaller than Y in the stop-loss order (written as X sl Y ) if E(X   d)+  E(Y   d)+
for all real numbers d. If, in addition, E(X) = E(Y ), then we say that X is smaller than
Y in the convex order (written as X cx Y ). It can be shown that X cx Y if and only if
E[f(X)]  E[f(Y )] for any convex function f for which the two expectations exist. We refer to
Denuit et al. (2005) and Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994) for a comprehensive treatment of
convex order.
A useful characterization of convex order using TVaR is given by the next lemma. Through-
out the paper, for a distribution function F, we use F  1 to denote its left-continuous inverse:
F
 1(p) := inffx 2 R j F(x)  pg; 0 < p < 1:








Y (t)dt; 0 < p < 1:
Lemma 1 X cx Y if and only if E(X) = E(Y ) and TVaRp(X)  TVaRp(Y ) for all 0 < p < 1.
Lemma 2 TVaR is sudadditive: For any random variables X and Y ,
TVaRp(X + Y )  TVaRp(X) + TVaRp(Y ) for all 0 < p < 1:
4For proofs of these two lemmas and other properties of TVaR, we refer to Dhaene et al. (2006).
A random vector (Y1;:::;Yn) is comonotonic if there exist a random variable V and n
increasing functions g1;:::;gn such that
(Y1;:::;Yn)
d = (g1(V );:::;gn(V )):
In particular, we may choose V to be any uniform(0;1) random variable, and gi to be F
 1
Yi .
Furthermore, by Corollary 6.11 of Kallenberg (2002), there is a uniform(0;1) random variable





Yn (U)) almost surely.




0))  0; !;!
0 2 
 n N:
A pair of random variables (X;Y ) is said to be counter-monotonic if (X; Y ) is comonotonic.
Lemma 3 (X;Y ) is comonotonic if and only if
TVaRp(X + Y ) = TVaRp(X) + TVaRp(Y ) for all 0 < p < 1:
The \only if" is a well-known result (see Dhaene et al. (2006)). The proof of the \if" part can
be found in Cheung (2010).
The next two lemmas summarize some fundamental relationships between comonotonicity
and the convex order. For proofs and further discussion, we refer to Dhaene et al. (2002a,
2002b).
Lemma 4 If Xi cx Yi for i = 1;2 and if (Y1;Y2) is comonotonic, then
X1 + X2 cx Y1 + Y2:
The next lemma is taken from Dhaene and Goovaerts (1996).




cc cx X + Y:
53 Proper hedges
We saw that conjectures (4) and (5) fail to hold true because the counter-monotonic asset Z
may over-hedge the original position X. In this section, we suggest one extra condition to be
imposed on a counter-monotonic asset so that over-hedging will not arise. To motivate our
discussion, we rst consider the following simple example.
Example 3 Suppose that we are holding a unit of stock. Let us denote the price of the stock
at a future time point T by X. A common strategy to reduce the risk of this position is to
purchase a European put option on this stock. After adding Z := (K   X)+ to X, the new
position is given by X + Z = max(X;K). Obviously, it is less risky than X. Another strategy
is to short one share of the same stock. In this case, Z :=  X and thus the new position X +Z
is identically zero. On the other hand, it is generally believed that longing two European put
options on the stock is not a good strategy to adopt, because in this case it is not clear whether
the new position X + 2(K   X)+ is less risky than X.
While all of the three strategies (holding one put, shorting one unit of stock, and holding
two puts) considered in Example 3 consist of adding counter-monotonic assets, our intuition
suggests that the rst two will not over-hedge but not necessarily the third one. There are two
dierent heuristic considerations that allow us to distinguish the rst two strategies from the
third:
(1) In the rst two strategies (holding a put or shorting a unit of stock), the hedged position
X + Z preserves the nature of the original position X in that both of them are bullish
on the stock price. In other words, (X;X + Z) is comonotonic, and hence the belief in
how the markets will move remains unchanged after Z is added. If X performs well, so
does the hedged position X +Z. However, the variation of the latter position (after Z is
added) is smaller because of the osetting nature of Z. For the third strategy (holding
two puts), the position X + Z is no longer comonotonic with X.
(2) While Z and X move in opposite directions, the decrement (or increment) of Z is always
less than the increment (or decrement) of X in the rst two strategies. In this way, adding
Z to X will not bring in an extra and unwanted price uctuation. However, the decrement
(or increment) of Z is always larger than the increment (or decrement) of X in the third
strategy.
To sum up, in order to avoid a counter-monotonic position Z to over-hedge X, the rst
consideration suggests that (X;X + Z) has to be comonotonic, while the second consideration
suggests that Z should have a smaller uctuation when compared to X. In the next result, we
show that these two considerations are indeed equivalent.
Lemma 6 If (X;Z) is counter-monotonic, then the following statements are equivalent:
6(a) (X;X + Z) is comonotonic;
(b) (Z;X + Z) is counter-monotonic;
(c) for some null set N,
jZ(!)   Z(!
0)j  jX(!)   X(!
0)j for any !;!
0 2 
 n N.
Proof: The equivalence between (a) and (b) is obvious.
Assume that (c) is true. Fix some !;!0 2 
 n N and assume that X(!0)  X(!). Then
(X(!)   X(!
0))(X(!) + Z(!)   X(!
0)   Z(!
0))  0;
which means that (X;X + Z) is comonotonic. Therefore, (a) is true.
Now we assume that (a) holds true. Then there is a uniform(0;1) random variable U such
that







almost surely. Denote by N the corresponding null set. Outside this null set, we have
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from which (c) follows. 
Motivated by the above discussion, we introduce the following denition.
Denition 2 A position Z is said to be a proper hedge of X if
(i) (X;Z) is counter-monotonic, and
7(ii) Z satises any one of the equivalent conditions stated in Lemma 6.
The collection of all proper hedges of X is denoted as H(X).
The next result shows that the counter-comonotonicity of (Z;X + Z) (condition (b) of
Lemma 6) implicitly implies the counter-monotonicity of (X;Z), and hence this condition alone
is equivalent to Z 2 H(X).
Lemma 7 Z 2 H(X) if and only if (Z;X + Z) is counter-comonotonic.
Proof: Suppose that Z 2 H(X). By denition and Lemma 6, (X;Z) is counter-monotonic,
and (X;X + Z) is comonotonic. Therefore, ( Z;X + Z) is comonotonic.
Conversely, suppose that ( Z;X+Z) is comonotonic. Extending this vector by including the
sum of  Z and X+Z as a new component leads to ( Z;X+Z;X), which is still comonotonic.
Hence by Lemma 6, Z 2 H(X). 
4 Proper hedge and convex order
In this section, we show that both conjectures (4) and (5) hold true if Z is a proper hedge of
X.
Proposition 1 If X cx Y and Z 2 H(X), then X + Z cx Y + E(Z). In particular, all
proper hedges of X are counter-monotonic convex hedges of X.
Proof: Fix any p 2 (0;1). Since Z 2 H(X), ( Z;X + Z) is comonotonic by Lemma 7. It
follows from Lemma 3 that
TVaRp(X + Z) + TVaRp( Z) = TVaRp(X):
Since X cx Y and  E(Z) cx  Z, Lemma 1 implies that
TVaRp(X)  TVaRp(Y )
and
 E(Z) = TVaRp( E(Z))  TVaRp( Z):
Combining all these, we have
TVaRp(X + Z) = TVaRp(X)   TVaRp( Z)  TVaRp(Y ) + E(Z) = TVaRp(Y + E(Z)):
By Lemma 1 again, X + Z cx Y + E(Z). 
8Proposition 2 If X cx Y and Z 2 H(X), then X + Z cx Y + Z.
Proof: Similarly as done in the proof of Proposition 1, for any 0 < p < 1, we have
TVaRp(X + Z) = TVaRp(X)   TVaRp( Z)  TVaRp(Y )   TVaRp( Z)  TVaRp(Y + Z);
where the last inequality follows from the subadditivity of TVaR. By Lemma 1, X+Z cx Y +Z.

5 Implications in optimal insurance problems
Suppose that a risk bearer is exposed to a random positive insurable loss X, and wishes to
reduce the risk by purchasing an insurance for X. Let I be the indemnity purchased such that
the risk bearer will receive I(x) from the insurer if x is the realized loss of X. In this section,
we assume that the indemnity schedule I is increasing and satises 0  I(x)  x. Severe moral
hazard may result without these assumptions.
The insurer, relying on the law of large number, usually sets the premium P at a level that
is greater than E[I(X)] to avoid a loss on average. Suppose that the risk bearer is an expected
utility maximizer with a wealth w and an increasing and concave utility function u. He will be
better o after purchasing I if
Eu(w   X + I(X)   P)  Eu(w   X): (7)
Let P  be the amount of premium that makes the above inequality an equality. This is the
maximum premium the risk bearer is willing to pay for I. In order for this insurance arrange-
ment to be mutually benecial to both the risk bearer and the insurer, P  has to be greater
than E[I(X)]. This leads us to the following denition:
Denition 3 Let I be an indemnity schedule. If for any positive integrable random variable
X, any wealth level w and any increasing and concave utility function u, the solution to the
equation
Eu(w   X + I(X)   P) = Eu(w   X)
is greater than E[I(X)], then we say I is a universally marketable indemnity.
From this denition, an indemnity schedule I is universally marketable if a mutually accept-
able premium can be found for every risk bearer, regardless of the wealth, the utility function,
and the underlying risk. This notion depends on how we judge the acceptability of a given
premium. In our setting here, a premium is acceptable to the insurer if it is no less than the
expected payment (so we are essentially assume the risk-neutrality of the insurer), and is ac-
ceptable to the risk bearer if a higher level of expected utility can be achieved after purchasing
the insurance.
9It is evident that a given indemnity schedule I may not be universally marketable without
possessing some extra structures. The next result provides a simple sucient condition for
universal marketability.
Proposition 3 If an indemnity schedule I is 1-Lipschitz, i.e.
0  s  t =) I(t)   I(s)  t   s;
then it is universally marketable.
Proof: Let X be an arbitrary positive integrable random variable. Suppose that I is an
1-Lipschitz indemnity schedule. The 1-Lipschitzian property of I implies that x   I(x) is
increasing in x, and thus (X;X   I(X)) is comonotonic. It then follows from Lemma 6 that
 I(X) 2 H(X). Proposition 1 then implies
X   I(X) cx X   E[I(X)]:
Therefore, for any wealth level w and any increasing and concave utility function u,
Eu(w   X + I(X)   E[I(X)])  Eu(w   X) = Eu(w   X + I(X)   P
):
As u is increasing, P   E[I(X)]. 
In fact, most commonly encountered indemnity schedules are 1-Lipschitz, such as (i) quota-
share contracts I(x) = cx, c 2 [0;1]; (ii) deductible contracts I(x) = (x d)+, d  0; (iii) limited
loss contracts I(x) = max(x;a), a  0; (vi) insurance layer contracts I(x) = (x d)+ (x a)+,
a  d  0; and (v) contracts that are convex. Proposition 3 explains their popularity in the
insurance market.
6 Association and convex order
Recall from (2) that the condition that (Y;Z) is comonotonic guarantees the validity of
X cx Y =) X + E(Z) cx Y + Z:
In this section, we show that the comonotonicity of (Y;Z) can be weakened by using the notion
of association.
Denition 4 A pair of random variables (X1;X2) is said to be
(b) positively associated if Cov(f(X1;X2);g(X1;X2))  0 for any increasing functions f;g :
R2 ! R;
10(b) weakly positively associated if Cov(f(X1);g(X2))  0 for any increasing functions f;g :
R ! R;
(c) negatively associated if Cov(f(X1);g(X2))  0 for any increasing functions f;g : R ! R.
From the denition, a comonotonic pair of random variables is weakly positively associated,
and a counter-monotonic pair of random variables is negatively associated.
In fact, weakly positive association is equivalent to a notion called positive quadrant depen-
dence. A pair of random variables (X1, X2) is said to be positively quadrant dependent (PQD)
if
FX1;X2(x1;x2)  FX1(x1)FX2(x2) for all real numbers x1;x2.
A proof of this equivalence can be found, for innstance, in Dhaene and Goovaerts (1996).
Similarly, negative association is equivalent to negative quadrant dependence, where (X1;X2) is
said to be negatively quadrant dependent (NQD) if
FX1;X2(x1;x2)  FX1(x1)FX2(x2) for all real numbers x1;x2.
We refer to Denuit et al. (2005), Mari and Kotz (2001), and M uller and Stoyan (2002) for a
more detailed discussion of these notions.
The next result generalizes relation (2) by weakening the comonotonicity requirement on
(Y;Z) to PQD.
Proposition 4 Suppose that Xi cx Yi for i = 1;2. If (X1;X2) is NQD and (Y1;Y2) is PQD,
then X1 + X2 cx Y1 + Y2:
Proof: Let (X?
1 ;X?
2 ) and (Y ?
1 ;Y ?
2 ) be copies of (X1;X2) and (Y1;Y2) respectively with
independent components. (X1;X2) being NQD implies that











2 cx Y1 + Y2:
Since X?
1 + X?
2 cx Y ?
1 + Y ?
2 , the result follows. 
Corollary 1 If X cx Y and (Y;Z) is weakly positively associated, then X +E(Z) cx Y +Z:
This corollary extends a result in Bakhtin (2001) (also see p. 115 of Bulinski and Shashkin
(2007)), in which the same conclusion is drawn under the stronger condition that (Y;Z) is
positively associated.
11Corollary 2 If X cx Y , (X;Z) is NQD and (Y;Z) is PQD, then X + Z cx Y + Z.
When compared to Proposition 2, the counter-monotonicity of (X;Z) is weakened to NQD
in this corollary. On the other hand, a positive dependence structure (PDQ) on (Y;Z) is needed
here.
Upon examining the proof of Proposition 4 closely, one nds that the notions of PQD and




1 + Y ?
2 . If we compare the distribution functions of (X1;X2) and (Y1;Y2) directly, we arrive
at the following result:
Proposition 5 Suppose that FX1;X2(s;t)  FY1;Y2(s;t) for all real numbers s;t, and E(Xi) 
E(Yi) for i = 1;2, then X1 + X2 sl Y1 + Y2:
Proof: The result follows immediately from the identity
E

(X1 + X2   d)+





which can be found for example in Dhaene et al. (2002a). 
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